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Abstract. Organic farming is expected to alleviate the environmental burden of agriculture, since
it rules out the use of chemicals such as synthetic fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides. However,
organic farming technology may turn out to be less efficient when evaluated by conventional
productivity measures that are less informative regarding environmental efficiency. We derive a
framework for a combination of more comprehensive indicators reflecting whether organic
farming increases sustainability in agriculture and how much of the total agricultural value added
is produced at the expense of environmental deterioration. We show that it is important to
separate flow and stock effects of pollution so that aggregate measurement is consistent with
conventional national accounting. Shadow pricing of undesirable output and policy implications
are discussed. For adoption of a technology and allocative efficiency in the agricultural sector,
economic policy instruments should be redesigned and proper incentives through prices should be
used.
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1 Introduction
The European Commission has recently made a proposal to reform the Common Agricultural
Policy (COM (2003) 23 final). It is claimed that the major objective of the reform is to give
farmers a long-term perspective for sustainable agriculture. In particular, the implementation of
the Commission reform would remove environmentally negative incentives and provide further
encouragement for more sustainable farming practices.
In line with the development of political climate towards a sustainable agriculture, organic
farming has become an important option for policies promoting food safety and environmental
quality of food production. There seems to be obvious political pressure to increase the adoption
of organic farming technology, and the Council of the European Union proposes, among other
things, that numbers of organic farms and area devoted to organic farming should be included in
the list of environment-related headline indicators of EU (COM (2002) 524 final). The motivation
is that by ruling out the use of synthetic fertilizers and other chemicals such as pesticides and
herbicides (e.g. Zanoli and Gambelli 1999) organic farming represents an environmentally ‘clean’
technology in agriculture. The organic farming technology has, nevertheless, developed with only
little input from scientific research (Lampkin et al. 1999), and it can be viewed as a constrained
version of conventional farming. In addition, the potential environmental friendliness does not
come without a cost. Yields in organic farming are in general significantly lower than under
conventional management, even though the yield differences vary between products and to a
certain extent between countries (Offerman and Nieberg, 2000).
Organic farming as a policy issue should be placed in the current context of international
development of agricultural sector. Depending on the farming strategies adopted also the
environmental impacts will change accordingly. It is necessary to evaluate the existing measures
of economic performance of conventional and organic farming technologies from a point of view
of environment, since conventional economic indicators may be misguided. We consider, in
particular, the applicability of efficiency indices and welfare accounting as sustainability
indicators for agricultural sector.
Agricultural income (value added) forms part of conventional national income accounting. When
a Net National Product (NNP) is calculated in practice, the measurement of economic activity is3
based on market transactions and market prices. However, consumption commodities differ in
their attributes and, at least in principle, the environmental impacts of products can be traced back
to the technology used in the production. Different production technologies imply different
environmental performance, and this should be reflected in welfare accounting. The same is true
for productivity measurement. What is crucial to notice in decision making it that productivity
measurement involves commonly used economic efficiency measures that are variant to the
prevailing prices. This may be a problem for evaluation of sustainability, since market prices of
final products do not capture social costs or benefits such as environmental quality. Our analysis
seeks to develop more comprehensive indicators of sustainability in agriculture for policy makers
by showing how the conventional indicators of economic performance should be completed.
In previous literature Hrubovcak et al. (2000) have developed a theoretical framework to
incorporate the environmental impacts of agricultural production into the existing income
accounts. Here, we take a step further in our analysis and introduce organic farming as an
alternative technology. We also discuss why the commonly applied modeling of environmental
stocks as part of utility function may be problematic for ‘green’ accounting
1 due to inconsistency
with the income accounting principles.
Another line of literature of evaluation of efficiency has in fact developed approaches to gain
information on social costs associated with production; firms' environmental performance is
measured with efficiency indexes that include undesirable outputs
2. These methods are not always
applicable, though (see, e.g., Smith 1998). The current empirical literature on the efficiency of
organic farming is rather limited, mainly because there have not been sufficient data on organic
farms. The existing rare studies on comparison of the performance of organic and conventional
farms also provide to some extent contradictory results on how efficient organic farming
technology is in using natural resources (e.g. Stolze et al. 2000, Grönroos and Seppälä 2000,
Oude Lansink et al. 2002).
                                                          
1 For a good overview of much of the green accounting literature, see Heal and Kriström (2002).
2 Modeling of productivity and undesirable outputs originated with the work by Pittman (1983) which has later been
extended into various approaches; see, e.g., Färe et al. (1989). Tyteca (1997) gives an overview with a comprehensive
bibliography.4
Here, we provide a systematic framework for economic efficiency measurement including
environmental impacts. We show also that there is a link from measurement of agricultural value
added to efficiency measurement at the farm level, since both indicators require some form of
shadow pricing of direct disutility of environmental deterioration. We aim to improve the policy
relevance of the aggregate welfare indicators regarding the economic and environmental features
of organic farming. In addition, the indicators derived here should be applicable to comparison of
alternative technologies also in other industries than agriculture. The framework also sheds light
on how prevailing conditions are reflected in existing indicators and they do not support or
provide incentives for adoption of new environmental friendly technologies.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a simple growth model in which
pollution (run-off of nutrients, leaching of pesticides) is a source of inefficiency and capital stock
incorporates the manufactured  means of production (equipment). For the sake of comparison we
separate two different types of technology specific capital stocks, and an additional stock is
included in the analysis to capture the dynamics of environmental deterioration. Section 3
illustrates the implications for output (NNP) and efficiency measurement, given that there are
differences in economic and environmental performance between farms using alternative
technologies. In section 4, the implementation of policies to attain socially optimal farming
strategies is discussed. Section 5 concludes.
2 Derivation of a socially optimal outcome
Our analytical framework starts from national accounting to identify the components of value
added generating growth in the agricultural sector. The framework is based on the result of
Weitzman (1976) which proves how net national welfare measurement can be theoretically
justified. The well-known result states the valuation principle for an economy maximizing utility
subject to capital stock over time. Formally, a first best optimal solution can be derived by setting
up a social planner's utility maximization problem over time. Utility is derived from consumption,
C, whereas the accumulation of capital, dk/dt = f(.) – C – δ k, is determined by total output, f(k),
minus consumption and depreciation of capital, i.e., investments. As shown by Weitzman, a
linear support  of the Hamiltonian along the optimal path corresponds to national welfare, or
NNP=C+I. We use the above accounting rule as a guiding principle to build up an output5
measurement framework for the agricultural sector. The basic model will be completed with
environmental impacts of production.
The agricultural sector produces goods C and G by using conventional and organic farming
technology, respectively. Chemicals (e.g., artificial fertilizers, pesticides), N, are used as inputs in
conventional farming, and a proportion α  of the total use of chemicals shows up as nuisance in
the utility function. The nuisance, or disutility can be, e.g., spoiled recreation possibilities due to
water pollution or negative health effects due to toxicity. Utility function takes the form
U(C,G,α N) with U!>0,  U">0, and U#<0, and it is strictly increasing, strongly concave and
discounted over time by a constant social interest rate, r > 0.
We posit two production functions which involve both organic production, g(K$, L$, A$), and
conventional production, f(K%,N, L%, A%).  Both technologies utilize capital (K%,, K$!"#$%&’(#(L%,,
L$!"#%)*#$%)*#(A%,, A$#!#+,-.,#%(/#0/.1’(#02/.-3-.#-)24105#6,/#7%-)#*-33/(/)./#-)#1,/#2(’*4.1-’)
34).1-’)0# -0# 1,/# 40/# ’3# 08)1,/1-.# .,/7-.%$0# +,-.,# %(/# &%))/*# -)# ’(9%)-.# 3%(7-)95# :8)1,/1-.
04&01%)./0# %(/# 40/*# ’)$8# -)# .’);/)1-’)%$# 3%(7-)9"# %)*# %)# excess use of chemicals leads to
undesirable residues, runoff and leaching of nutrients and/or pesticides, α N5
On the other hand, one of the key points of organic farming is the increase, or at least
maintenance of soil fertility on a long-term basis. Since chemicals are not allowed to be used,
organic farming relies on crop rotation which contributes positively to the soil fertility. To capture
a potentially positive long-term impact of organic farming, G, we describe the deterioration of
environmental conditions (soil, water quality) as a dynamic process with an equation of motion
dW/dt=α N –G. Given that the economy places value on a long-term sustainability in agriculture,
the changes in these environmental conditions should be taken into account.
Let us now set up the social planner’s optimization problem over time. The objective function
∫
∞
−
o
rtdt e N G C U ) , , ( α
is to be maximized subject to the equations of motion for capital stocks in conventional, K1, and
organic, K2, production6
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.
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(3)  3 2 1 A A A A + + =
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and finally subject to the equation of motion of environmental deterioration
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.
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For the maximization problem of the social planner, we write the Lagrangian
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From (7), (9), (11) and (13) the optimality necessitates that
(20)
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to guarantee efficient input use in conventional farming. In particular, the use of chemicals is
optimal up to the point where the utility value of the marginal productivity of chemicals equals
the direct disutility (U#) and the dynamic impact of environmental deterioration (τ ) that are
proportional to the use of chemicals (α ).
Accordingly, equations (8), (10) and (12) determine optimal input use in organic farming
 (21)
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τ + = + = .
Since the shadow price reflecting the environmental deterioration is negative, equation (21)
means that organic farming technology should be employed up to the point where the direct
production/input costs are exceeded by the amount of τ   when the enhancement of environmental
quality is properly taken into account. Consequently, how much of each technology should
optimally be adopted is determined by
(22)
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Organic farming should be favored at the expense of conventional farming because of its positive
environmental impact which equals the amount of τ  at the margin. This has been illustrated in
Figure 1 which shows that optimal allocation of outputs produced by conventional and organic
farming technology is dependent on relative prices (in terms of marginal utilities) and the shadow
price τ . In section 4, we discuss the importance of correct prices for efficiency measurement, but8
before that we show how conventional economic indicators such as agricultural value added in
national product and efficiency indexes based on farm level data may be misleading from an
environmental point of view.
3 Why do conventional indicators of economic performance discriminate against clean
technology?
We start by discussing first the implications of our choice to model pollution impacts as
undesirable but unavoidable output and then derive explicitly an accounting framework for
extended green accounts for agricultural sector. In our model,  chemicals are a positive and
necessary input in conventional farming (fN>0), but an excessive use of the chemicals can have
undesirable impacts in the long run, and these impacts are captured by a negative term in the
utility function (α N). The flow of undesirable production becomes a source of inefficiency. In this
respect, our model differs from the previous dynamic pollution models by, e.g., Aronsson and
Löfgren (1999) (see also the references therein), which have been influenced by the model of
Brock (1977). In Brock's model pollution enters as a separate argument, in the form of a stock, in
the utility function and therefore inevitably decreases utility directly. A similar modeling of
pollution in a purely mathematical sense is adopted in Hartwick (1990) where pollution stock is a
negative argument in the production function. This, however, implies negative `preferences' on
the part of firms towards pollution, which contrasts with the spirit adopted by Brock, who
considers pollution as a positive input on the producers' side.
What is common to all of these previous models, however, is that the shadow value of pollution
is determined by preferences towards the stock of pollution directly. This has an important
implication for measurement practices in extended green national accounting. It means that the
total stock of pollution should be valued annually. This in part contradicts the value added
thinking in conventional national accounts. The (man-made) capital stock as such is never valued
separately but the changes in the stock are. I.e., investments are a component of Net National
Product (NNP), since investments form the actual annual value added. Logically, it is the flow of
pollution, or undesirable production, not the stock, that enters the utility function in our modeling.
As will become evident below, this gives more realistic possibilities to value or shadow price the
negative environmental impacts associated with production.9
(i) National accounting and measurement of undesirable output
Now we are in a position to derive a welfare measure that includes measurable environmental
impacts. We linearize the utility function,  ) (⋅ U , and form the current value Hamiltonian from the
optimization problem presented in section 2
W K K N U G U C U N G C & & & τ λ λ α τ + + + + ⋅ + ⋅ = Η 2 2 1 1
and using the first order conditions (13) and (19) we rewrite
) ( 2 2 1 1 B N K K N N f U G U C U N C G C − + + + − − ⋅ + ⋅ = Η α τ λ λ τα τ & & .
Dividing the linearized current value Hamiltonian by  1 λ  (=  C U ), we arrive at a monetary value
measure of a green NNP
(23) 2 1 K p K G p N f C P N N G G G N & & ⋅ + + ⋅ + − = τ τ τ
where(U=-τ )/U> is denoted by p=τ  .
The conventional NNP is defined as consumption plus net investment evaluated at market prices.
In equation (23), C  and  G stand for consumption of measured desirable output, pollution
excluded. However, the conventional NNP should be adjusted to account for environmental
consumption and its impact on the Hicksian concept of income, or the maximum amount that can
be consumed while still leaving capital intact. The above equation suggests two adjustments: the
contribution of nutrients should be deducted from national product, f#N, and market prices of
organic products should be corrected with τ . We discuss the shadow price and price corrections
more thoroughly in the next section, since socially non-optimal market prices have strong
implications for conventional efficiency measurement and evaluation of productivity. Instead, we
focus on the overall downward adjustment of NNP here.10
As for deduction of f#N from national product, the logic becomes evident from equation (13). In
optimum  C N N U U f / ) ( τ α + − =  which tells that the productivity of synthetic fertilizers must be
equal to the disutility of their negative environmental impacts. That is why the undesirable, but
unavoidable pollution flow, or a negative environmental impact can be valued using fN. This has
been illustrated in Figure 2 where the output combination (Co,Go) is produced at the expense of a
chemical flow No. The environmentally adjusted NNP derived above suggests that the
conventionally measured NNP exaggerates the positive contribution of production. For a more
comprehensive measure of  annual production, environmental effects should included. First, the
environmentally harmful output measured by the amount of N and valued by fN should be taken
into account. Second, the market prices should be corrected for the shadow price of
environmental deterioration. The latter is particularly important for policy making, since if the
prices will not be corrected, there will be no incentive to adopt the optimal amount of
environmental friendly technology. Consequently, the conventional measures of economic
efficiency will misleadingly indicate the more environmentally friendly technology (organic
farming) to be less efficient than the conventional one. This will be discussed in the following.
(ii) Efficiency indexes and market prices of good commodities
The previous literature of production theory involves a number of commonly used efficiency
measures to evaluate firm-level economic performance (see, e.g., Battese 1992, Fried et al. 1993).
The measures are calculated relative to a given technology, which is generally represented by
some form of frontier function. Here we will use output-orientated measures for our illustration of
potential environmental biases in conventional measures.
Let us consider the case where production involves two outputs (C and G) and a single input (L).
Holding the input quantity fixed at a particular level ( L L = )  we can represent the technology by
a production possibility in two dimensions. In Figure 3 the line HH’ is the production possibility
curve which represent the upper bound of production possibilities. Therefore, an economy
operating at the point A is inefficient, since the output combination of A lies below the curve.
The distance AA’ represents technical inefficiency, or the amount by which outputs could be
increased without requiring extra input. Hence, a measure of output-orientated technical
efficiency is the ratio OA/OA’. Given that we have price information for C and G, we can define11
the allocative efficiency with the help of the isorevenue line JJ’ as OA’/OA
m. Finally, overall
economic efficiency is the product of these two measures, (OA/OA’)x(OA’/OA
m). (See Coelli et
al 1998, Chapter 6).
What can be noted from the efficiency measures defined above is that the measures of allocative
and overall economic efficiency are variant to the prevailing prices. As was shown in section 2
the socially optimal prices may deviate from market prices, and environmentally less harmful
production technologies are deemed to be less efficient when market prices are used. This can be
seen from Figure 3 by drawing a new isorevenue line KK’ which corresponds to socially optimal
price ratio adjusted by τ . Changing the prices would improve the measure of economic efficiency
of organic farming, and corresponding to the point A the measure would become
(OA/OA’)x(OA’/OA
s).
At this point we should comment the most recent development in modern efficiency measurement
which has already been extended to include undesirable, polluting commodities that are outputs
from some production process (see, e.g., Färe and Grosskopf 1998). In particular, the latest
approaches can be used to derive explicitly shadow prices for polluting outputs (see, e.g., Färe et
al. 2002). However, these methods allow efficiency comparisons between decision making units
(firms, farms) only in cases where pollution is an unavoidable by-product and no environmentally
clean technologies exist. In our example, organic farming is, by definition, a totally clean
technology in the sense that the use of synthetic chemicals is ruled out. Therefore, we need a
measure acknowledging this kind of total input discrimination in organic farming vis-a-vis other
production technologies in agriculture. In addition, computation of shadow prices in the context
of efficiency measurement normally imposes implicit constraints on the value of shadow prices.
(See e.g., Färe et al. 2002)  The valuation is implicitly done during the course of formalization of
the objective function by deciding beforehand how large a reduction in the undesirable output is
wanted with respect to an increase in the desirable output. This fact has not been emphasized in
the previous shadow pricing literature, though.
We have shown how both the aggregate income accounting (NNP) and the micro-level efficiency
measures may be misleading indicators, since they fail to give credit for efforts advancing
sustainability. Now the question is how the socially optimal outcome could be implemented.12
 4 Improving the indicators of economic and environmental performance and implementing
the socially optimal outcome
It is evident from above that both the measurement of output (welfare accounting) and economic
performance (efficiency indexes) should be developed further if they were to be used as indicators
of productivity and environmental sustainability of agricultural sector. However, the challenge is
more complicated than just making adjustments in conventional measures to create more
appropriate indicators for policy makers. The adjustments should be internalized in prices of
commodities exchanged in the marketplace.
Following the tradition in literature on social planner’s optimal control, it can be shown how the
socially optimal solution can be attained in a market economy. The derivation of the optimal
conditions for a controlled market economy is straightforward and derived several times in
different contexts in the previous literature (for hints see, e.g., Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen 1993,
Aronsson and Löfgren 1999). In our example, the optimal economic instruments that should used
to reach a socially optimal solution necessitates a tax (tN) on the use of chemicals and a subsidy
(sG) on commodities  produced by organic farming technology. An optimal pollution tax would
be 
*
1 / *) ( λ τ α + − = N N U t  and an optimal commodity subsidy 
*
2 / * λ τ = G s where  τ * is the
shadow price of environmental deterioration, 
*
1 λ is the shadow price of capital in conventional
farming, and 
*
1 λ is the shadow price of capital in organic farming.
From the first order condition (13) an optimal value of the shadow price of environmental
deterioration is  α τ / * N C N f U U − − =  which is the difference between a direct welfare effect and
a productivity effect contributing to the production of desirable output. The latter can be more
easily measured from market data but for the evaluation of direct disutility other environmental
valuation methods are called for (such as stated preference methods; see, e.g., Braden and Kolstad
1992).
After valuation of both components of τ  , optimal policy could be implemented with the help of
economic instruments presented above. It should be emphasized that nothing guarantees that
optimal taxes and subsidies balance the government budget. In contrary, it is highly unlikely that
the total tax revenues (tN⋅ N) would equal the total subsidy payments (sG⋅ G) in a socially13
optimizing economy. In practice, given the current income structure and large subventions in
agriculture, economic instruments should be redesigned to give proper incentives to attain
socially optimal environmental quality. To reach other socially important targets such as
sustainable distribution of income non-distorting lump-sum transfers should be used from a point
of view of environmental policy. Therefore, it would be interesting to study how the optimal and
budget-balancing policies differ in terms of adoption of clean technologies. An overall evaluation
of government tax policy is too broad an issue to be tackled here, though.
In any case, for the economic indicators to be more comprehensive from a point of view of
environmental deterioration they should be derived using  correct social cost information. In
welfare accounting, output of organic production would be valued using the socially optimal
prices. The corrected prices should also be used when evaluating the allocative and economic
efficiency of organic production.
5. Conclusions
The implications derived here are valid for any choice between conventional and environmentally
clean technology: too little is produced by clean technology and too much under conventional
management practices.
Our theoretical framework for national accounting takes into account environmental impacts of
alternative production technologies in agriculture. A formalized optimization problem helps to
keep track of direct and indirect environmental effects. In particular, the productivity of polluting
input must equal the direct disutility of pollution (e.g., nuisance impacts on recreation through
water quality, toxicity impacts on human health) and the dynamic effect of a deterioration of the
environment over time.
An important issue is the practical valuation of negative environmental impacts: many pollution
impacts can be valued or estimated using opportunity costs, but not all of them. Computation of
shadow prices in the context of efficiency measurement normally imposes implicit constraints on
the value of shadow prices. The valuation is implicitly done during the course of formalization of
the optimization problem by deciding beforehand the ratio in which the undesirable output is14
reduced and the desirable output increased. This should be emphasized more clearly in the
shadow pricing literature.
However, we should look more carefully at environmental effects of alternative  production
technologies, especially the quantitative data on inputs that are transformed to undesirable outputs
during the production process. By considering pollution as a source of inefficiency in an
economy, we take into account the external effects of production on the state of the environment.
Trade-offs between economic efficiency vs. environmental efficiency can be explored
appropriately.
In addition, we have pointed out that inclusion of environmental stocks as part of utility function
may be problematic for interpretation of extended ‘green’ national accounts. In the previous
literature, the growth models used to derive green welfare measures theoretically have at least
implicitly required the valuation of the total pollution stock to capture environmental impacts.
This is not in the spirit of annual income accounting principles of measuring only investments,
not (capital) stocks as such.
Finally, it should be emphasized that nothing guarantees that the environmentally optimal taxes
and subsidies suggested here balance the government budget. In practice, this is a result of
political compromising. The current income structure and subventions in agriculture
notwithstanding, economic policy instruments could be redesigned to give proper incentives to
attain socially optimal environmental quality.15
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